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ABSTRACT
Economic analysis indicates that a socially optimal level of mining may not
be occurring under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act
1976 (ALKA). This paper suggests that this is either because transactions
costs are hindering negotiations between miners and Aborigines or because
some strategic behaviour problem is present.
This paper discusses whether the mining provisions of the Native Title Act
1993 (NTA) have, at a statutory level, the potential to overcome the
difficulties evident in the ALRA's operation. It is argued that transactions
costs will probably be less under the NTA than under the ALRA and that a
liability rule is likely to be more efficient than a property right as
transactions costs increase. This suggests that the ALRA is inefficient
compared to the NTA. The merits of arbitration in an environment of
strategic behaviour, which is generally better disciplined by a liability rule,
are also discussed. The general conclusion is that the NTA has the potential
to lead to more efficient outcomes than the ALRA.
Definitions of technical economic terms used in this discussion paper can
be found in the glossary at the end of the paper.
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Foreword
In May 1994 I gave a lecture on the economic significance of land rights
and native title to a small group undertaking a course Economic Policy
Issues in the Faculty of Economics and Commerce. One of the students in
that class, Siobhan McKenna, engaged me in a discussion about the relative
efficiency of statutory land rights and native title regimes. Subsequently,
Siobhan decided to write her Bachelor of Economics Honours thesis on this
topic and I was one of her advisers. While completing her degree, Siobhan
was recruited by McKinsey and Company in Sydney as a business analyst;
she was to begin work early in 1995.
I read Siobhan's thesis A Second Best Choice: Does the Native Title Act
1993 or the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976
Generate Greater Allocative Efficiency as it was written and was concerned
that a potentially significant piece of research might be lost to both the
academic and policy community. Subsequently, I offered Siobhan a post as
a visiting graduate research assistant at CAEPR to rework her Honours
thesis into a CAEPR Discussion Paper. During the time Siobhan was with
CAEPR, from November 1994 to late January 1995, she not only
completed this Discussion Paper, but also further developed it into a
refereed article 'Negotiating mining agreements under the Native Title Act
1993', to be published in Agenda in August. In March 1995, Siobhan
returned to CAEPR for a brief visit and presented a version of this paper in
a CAEPR Seminar Series 'Policy Aspects of Native Title'.
In a special section Focus on Mabo in the Australian Economic Review in
September 1993, Peter Kenyon and I argued that not only is the analytic
toolkit of microeconomics admirably suited to focus on efficiency aspects
of native title law, but that economists should take the plunge and use this
toolkit to enter a very significant and contemporary policy debate. Siobhan
McKenna as a young graduate economist is to be commended for her
willingness not only to participate in the debate, but also for making a
valuable contribution to it.
Jon Altman
Series Editor
April 1995
The issue of Aboriginal ownership and control over land entails political
and social decisions. However, given different land rights regimes, an
economic assessment should be made of their relative efficiency.
Economists tend to evaluate property rights systems on the basis of
whether they ensure resources go towards their most valued use. From an
economic perspective, mining should be allowed to occur up to the point
where the value of allowing increased mining equals the detriment to
Aborigines from that mining occurring. If mining is allowed to increase
past this point there will be an efficiency loss because Aboriginal valuation
of that undisturbed land use is greater than the total benefits accruing from
the increased level of mining. Within this context a desirable legal regime
would be one that allowed both miners and Aborigines to clearly express
their valuations of land and allowed land to pass freely between them.
Under s.ll of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976
(ALRA), the Aboriginal Land Commissioner recommends to the minister
whether an Aboriginal group making a claim to land has by Aboriginal
tradition, the right to use or occupy an area of land. If it is, then this land is
held for the traditional owners in a land trust that operates under the
direction of the relevant land council who must consent before any dealing
with the land, including mining, is allowed (ss.40(a)). Under ss.!2(2) and
(3) of the ALRA, rights to sub-soil minerals remain with the Northern
Territory or the Commonwealth, but the land council's right to consent
provides traditional owners with a veto over the exploration for, or the
extraction of, minerals on their land. Initially this veto was exercisable at
both the exploration and mining stages of a grant, meaning that mining
contracts were disjunctive agreements. The ALRA was amended in 1987
so that the veto could be exercised at the exploration stage only, making
mining contracts conjunctive. If land councils consent to a mining
application moneys, generally equivalent to statutory royalties derived
from the project, are paid into the Aboriginals Benefit Trust Account
(ABTA) by the Commonwealth Government, with a proportion (30 per
cent, ss.64(3)) earmarked for distribution among traditional owners and
Aborigines living in areas affected by the mining. The veto power provided
by the ALRA can be viewed as a de facto property right that is traded
between miners and Aboriginal land holders.
In the Native Title Act 1993 (NTA) there is no veto provision; instead,
native title holders are able to negotiate (Division 3, subdivision B) as to
the compensation amount and the terms and conditions under which their
land will be used; negotiation rights not enjoyed to the same extent by non-
Aboriginal land holders. During this negotiation period the compensation
amount agreed upon by the parties can make reference to the mine's
potential income, output or profits (s.33). If no agreement can be reached
within a specified period, an arbitration process follows where a
determination of whether the act may proceed is made (ss.38(l)). In this
arbitration phase Aborigines are only entitled to compensation for the
impairment of native title rights, which is independent of the value of
minerals present (ss.38(2». This is essentially a liability rule.
Standard economic analysis examining the implications of assigning
property rights or setting liability rules can be applied to determine the
relative efficiency of the ALRA and the NTA, although given the
extremely complex nature of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander affairs
policy, some general simplifications are needed. There are two reasons to
suppose that a liability rule solution would be efficient relative to a
property right assignment in the situation described above. First, because if
market transactions costs are prohibitive then the assignment of a property
right will generate allocative inefficiency (relative to some Utopian
allocation, see Demsetz 1982: 41-3) and the assignment of a liability rule,
where the transaction is removed from the market and placed in front of an
arbitrator, may be efficient in comparison (Landes and Posner 1987: 29-
41). This will only be so if the arbitrator correctly reflects the valuations of
both parties in its decision. Secondly, because the existence of a bilateral
monopoly can require the threat of arbitration (a liability rule) to generate
trade (Cooler and Marks 1982).'
Transactions costs
Cease's (1960) definition of transactions costs which includes (a) the cost
of searching for parties with whom to negotiate, (b) the cost of
negotiations, and (c) the cost of enforcing a contract, will be used to
identify the transactions costs associated with trading property rights under
the ALRA compared with the costs associated with transacting under the
NTA. It should be noted that transactions costs have the potential to
generate inefficiency irrespective of to whom they accrue and that the
Coase theorem is solely concerned with allocative efficiency. It ignores the
wealth effects that are associated with a reassignment of rights between
parties.
The cost of searching for parties with whom to negotiate
Under the ALRA
Before negotiations for an agreement to allow exploration can commence
traditional owners have to be identified. The exhaustive process necessary
to identify the range of traditional owners' rights and interests, has been
claimed as a major factor delaying the start of negotiations under the
ALRA (Northern Territory Department of Mines and Energy 1984: 9).
This problem has been exacerbated because 90 per cent of unsuccessful
Aboriginal land claims are resubmitted (Pinney 1993: 3). If a claim for
traditional ownership has already been successful then negotiations can
immediately commence, although under ss.46(4)(b) and ss.48A(4)(b) of
the ALRA other affected parties also have to be identified and consulted.
Under s.24 of the ALKA, the creation of a register of traditional owners is
discretionary and the land councils have not exercised this discretion.
Traditional Aboriginal ownership can incorporate a myriad of rights and
obligations and these rights may not be consistent across groups or
consistent over time (Peterson 1983; Brandl and Walsh 1983; Ingold,
Riches and Woodburn 1991). Therefore, the costs associated with
establishing these varying rights as well as maintaining information on
them, would be high. The benefit of having such a register within the
context of the ALRA is limited, given that miners could not negotiate
directly with traditional owners even if a continually updated and definitive
register of traditional owners did exist.2 This is in contrast to the NTA
where a body corporate, representative of native title holders' interests, will
be registered and miners can negotiate directly with that body corporate.
Under the NTA
The costs associated with identifying native title parties under the NTA
should not be as significant as those of identifying traditional owners under
the ALRA for three main reasons.
The first potential reduction in transactions costs under the NTA compared
with the ALRA, stems from the option for native title claimants to be
represented by their own bodies for the claims process rather than by the
land councils. This option of multi-representative bodies was outlined by
Prime Minister Keating in the Native Title Bill's second reading speech of
16 November 1993; 'We will therefore under the bill, determine
representative Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander organisations to assist
claimants. They will not have a monopoly on representing native title
claimants: individual claimants or groups of claimants can go elsewhere if
they wish.' There is also provision under s.203 of the NTA for ministerially
approved representative bodies to apply for federal funding to assist them
in establishing native title claims.3 It was certainly the intent of the
legislators to provide scope for claimants to have choice in representation,
however, there may be a limit on the resources available to fund
representative bodies, meaning that in practice Aborigines wanting to make
claims may be forced, for financial reasons, to accept representative bodies
that not only represent them but also represent opposing claimants, (within
the limits imposed by legal ethics which ensure separate legal
representation for the parties). The NTA's funding provisions are in
contrast to those of the ALRA where, under ss.64(l), Aboriginal
representation is funded by resources with a direct nexus to mining
royalties from the ASTA. Discussion of this aspect of the ALRA has
continued throughout the ALRA's existence (Turnbull 1978; Rowland
1980; Altman 1983; Vachon and Toyne 1983; Altman and Dillon 1988;
Industry Commission (1C) 1991).
Secondly, the NTA under Part 7 and Part 8 created two native title
registers; one contains native title holders and the other claimants.
Following lodgement of an application for a claimant or non-claimant
determination of native title, the Registrar makes available for public
inspection a summary of the information contained in the application,
except for information in respect of which a request for confidentiality has
been made and accepted. Supporting material is not made available for
public inspection until after formal acceptance. Following acceptance of an
application, two files are created, an Open File containing material relating
to the application which is available for public inspection. Any material
lodged with or obtained by the Tribunal in relation to the application and
correspondence between the Tribunal and parties, or persons seeking to
become parties, is also placed on the Open File. There is also a
Confidential File created in respect of each application and material may
be placed on that file at the discretion of the Registrar pursuant to the
provisions of s. 155 of the NTA (French 1994: 24).
Once a determination of native title has been made, a body corporate will
be created to represent the native title holders. There may be more than one
native title holder at common law but for the purposes of the NTA that
holder or those holders will be legally represented by the one body (s.57).
This body corporate will then be registered and miners can negotiate
directly with it. The operation of these provisions will provide a degree of
transparency not present in the ALRA. The native title register is not
definitive in the sense that the Torrens Register of ordinary land
ownership, that gives indefeasible title to those land holders registered on
it, is definitive. The security that the native title register does offer,
however, is that if an agreement for mining is reached between a registered
body corporate and a miner then the registered body corporate can be
guaranteed the contractual terms agreed to by that miner and the
government not the miner, will be liable for compensation for that act to
any subsequent native title party.
Lastly, and probably most significantly, under s.29 of the NTA, it is the
responsibility of the native title claimant to make its claim known, within a
two-month notice period, at the time of the proposed future act. If a native
title party comes forward after that two-month period the act will still be
valid (ss.28(l)(a)). Once a native title claim is registered, however, it
becomes the responsibility of the government to make the native title party
aware of the proposed future act. In contrast, amendments had to be made
in 1987 to attempt to overcome delay problems inherent in the original
ALRA. These amendments set out a time limit (12 months) within which
land councils should identify traditional owners and commence negotiation
with mining companies for the grant of exploration licences. No limit was
introduced at the mining tenement stage. The new time limit has often been
extended by the minister, under ss.42(13)(c). Of the 77 exploration licences
under consideration in 1993, the 12 month negotiation period was extended
by more than six months in 75 cases and by more than 12 months in 67
cases (Pinney 1993: 8).
The cost of negotiations
Under the ALKA
The costs of negotiating agreements under the ALRA have been
substantial. Giants Reef Mining NL (1993: 79) estimated that its base
acquisition costs for an exploration licence of average size on non-
Aboriginal land in the Northern Territory, including identification,
application and retention, is around $46,500. The additional cost on
Aboriginal land is estimated to be $30,000 per exploration licence of
average size. The average size of exploration licence applications on
Aboriginal land is larger than on non-Aboriginal land which indicates that
this averaging process would tend to overstate the cost contrast between
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal land. These additional costs are functions,
first, of the need to consult Aborigines living in the areas affected by a
mine's operation (a procedure that is not widely required on non-
Aboriginal land), secondly, of the costs associated with the procedural
mechanisms necessary to negotiate contracts between miners and
Aborigines, and thirdly, of the compensation provisions of the ALRA. The
first cost is not discussed below because the requirement for consultation
prior to mining Aboriginal land is inherent both in the NTA and the
ALRA.
There has been much discussion in the literature on the significance of
disjunctive/conjunctive agreements under the ALRA. Aboriginal interests
argue that it is difficult to negotiate satisfactory conjunctive agreements
because a mine's potential operation is uncertain at the exploration stage.
Miners argue that it is difficult to negotiate satisfactory disjunctive
agreements because of the risk associated with spending money in
exploration when the subsequent right to mine may be refused. Since the
1987 amendments that removed the veto at the mining stage, some land
councils have countered the reduction in costs associated with this
amendment by requiring detailed provisions relating to mining to be
included in exploration agreements.
These provisions have specified, for example, the potential operation of the
project, protection of sacred sites, the miner's facilities at the mine site,
instruction on Aboriginal culture, employment, training, Aboriginal
participation in the mine's development, employee transport (including
access roads) and accommodation, medical facilities, liquor control,
preparation of the recovery of minerals, and termination of activities
(Brown and Claridge 1994: 13). Given the potential for mining to impose
both social and environmental costs on Aborigines (Christensen 1985;
Ross and Johnson 1989; Commonwealth of Australia 1991; Howitt 1991;
O'Faircheallaigh 1991) these provisions seem justified. In effect, however,
this has meant that miners who want only to explore are being asked to
negotiate a production agreement even though few exploration licences,
perhaps one in 1,000, lead to the development of a mine (Ewing 1994: 6).
Some miners and land councils have tried to overcome these difficulties by
making disjunctive agreements. In the Stockdale Case,4 for example, the
mining agreement was disjunctive in the sense that the prior consent of the
NLC was required to grant any mining interest over the land in question.
The contract also stipulated that if the parties did enter into a mining
agreement it would be based upon the terms and conditions set out in the
exploration agreement, and that the parties would not resort to arbitration if
the terms and conditions of mining could not be agreed upon (Brown and
Claridge 1994: 14). Justice Kearney found that the above provisions were
unenforceable and void because they were contrary to Part IV (Mining) of
the ALRA. He found that it was integral to the ALRA's operation that there
should only be one opportunity for the land councils to refuse consent.
Since this case only conjunctive agreements have been entered into (M.
Davis, 'Miners, Aborigines get down to business', Business Review Weekly,
26 September 1994: 24-28).
The compensation arrangements of the ALRA add to the difficulties
associated with negotiating agreements between miners and Aborigines. If
mining occurs on Aboriginal land then moneys are paid into the ABTA;
mining companies pay the Northern Territory Government royalties when
they mine (18 per cent of profits for minerals and 10 per cent for petroleum
and gas) and the Commonwealth Government then pays, dollar for dollar,
the same amount into the ABTA.5
The outlays of the ABTA fall into three main categories.6 Payment of 40
per cent of ABTA revenue to land councils to finance ministerially-
approved budgets occurs under ss.64(l); supplementary amounts are
available under ss.64(7). Ss.64(4) allows for grants for the benefit of
Northern Territory Aborigines generally, although traditional owners are
not excluded from receiving such moneys. These ss.64(4) payments are
made in recognition that not all Aborigines have access to their traditional
land and therefore do not have the opportunity to benefit from the use of it
or gain from its commercial productivity. The ABTA earmarks 30 per cent
of its revenue for this purpose. Since 1989 these grants have mainly been
used to purchase pastoral stations for dispossessed Aborigines, which can
then be claimed under s.50 of the ALRA.
Ss.64(3) stipulates grants to land councils for the purpose of redistribution,
under s.35(2), to Aborigines living in areas affected by mining, including
the traditional owners; 30 per cent of the ABTA's income is earmarked for
this purpose. These moneys are distributed by the land councils to
Incorporated Aboriginal Associations and Aboriginal Councils. This
incentive structure was noted in the 1991 1C report as being potentially
insufficient to generate a level of mining that adequately reflects
Aboriginal valuation of undisturbed land use. The 1C recommended that
ss.64(3) grants be increased to allow payment of 70 per cent of ABTA
income to those living in areas affected by mining and that the land
councils be funded, like other statutory authorities, from consolidated
revenue. It should be noted that traditional owners and Aborigines living in
areas affected by mining also receive s.43 and s.44 payments (additional
negotiated royalties) and these go some way towards overcoming incentive
problems. These payments are administered according to contractual
arrangements with the mining companies, and are usually paid to
incorporated groups of traditional owners and residents via land councils.
Under the NTA
The granting of exploration and mining licences under the NTA would
seem, at the level of the actual legislation, to be simpler and cheaper than
under the ALRA. The two costs associated with negotiating mining
agreements under the ALRA that are discussed above, will probably be
ameliorated to some extent by provisions in the NTA, although actual costs
will only become apparent as the NTA's operations shift from theory to
practice. These costs have the potential to be reduced first, because the
NTA includes provisions to accelerate negotiations and a binding
arbitration system that will encourage the parties to self-regulate, and
secondly, because the financial incentive structure within the mining
provisions of the NTA is clearer than that of the ALRA.7
The NTA provides a disjunctiveframework. A mining company can come
to a negotiated or arbitrated agreement with a native title holder to explore;
if a mining licence application is made, the negotiation/arbitration
procedures will again apply, although that native title holder cannot reopen
discussion at this time on matters already discussed at the exploration
stage, except at the discretion of the arbitrator (s.40). The native title holder
can apply to the arbitral body for the mine not to proceed irrespective of
negotiations at the exploration stage (s.39). Given that the ALRA has been
conjunctive since 1987 (albeit unintentionally) it is somewhat surprising
that the NTA is disjunctive. It must be presumed either that the strength of
Aboriginal interest groups was such that the NTA was made disjunctive
rather than conjunctive (perhaps in exchange for the lack of a veto right?)
or that the costs associated with designing conjunctive agreements, under
the ALRA, have been such as to induce this change in policy.
Irrespective of whether disjunctive or conjunctive agreements generate
greater costs, the NTA has other provisions that can be utilised to
substantially reduce transactions costs: exclusion clauses, an expedited
process, and a binding arbitration process.
It is possible that the Commonwealth Minister for Aboriginal and Torres
Straight Islander Affairs, under ss.26(3) and (4), may exempt a future grant
from the negotiation/arbitration procedures if the grant will have minimal
impact on native title rights and the native title holder/claimant can be
properly consulted about access.8 It is also possible that an expedited
procedure (s.29, s.32, s.75 and s.237) may apply - this only applies if the
grant, in the opinion of the arbitral body, will not interfere with the
community life of the native title holders or their areas of significance, and
will not cause major disturbance to the land or waters involved. If the
expedited provisions are used to exempt exploration activities the
negotiation/arbitration procedures will only apply at the mining licence
grant stage. This provision is yet to be exercised, but if it operates as
outlined above, it will provide an opportunity for mining companies to
explore land and engage in the costly negotiation/arbitration procedures
only if they subsequently wish to mine. Within the mining industry there
seems to be support for the use of the expedited provisions (M. Davis,
'Miners, Aborigines get down to business', Business Review Weekly, 26
September 1994: 26), although overtures by the Commonwealth
Government towards the Western Australian Government suggesting the
use of the exclusion provisions or the expedited provisions have been
rejected (Altman 1994: 16).
The financial incentives for Aborigines to come to agreements with miners
would appear to be clearer under the NTA than under the ALRA. Within
the negotiation period the native title party has the scope to appropriate
rents from activity on land over which native title is either recognised or
has not been extinguished, by including in the negotiated agreement
reference to the profits, income or output of the mine (s.33). This
represents a potential de facto royalty. The negotiated agreement can also
include any terms and conditions as to the mine's operation (including, for
example access, supply of essential services, sacred site protection,
environmental issues) and any joint ventures, employment conditions, or
training. Any compensation amount agreed upon will be paid in full by the
mining company to the body corporate. These moneys will probably be
paid retrospectively and periodically as they would be under the ALRA.
At arbitration the arbitral body will decide whether the proposed act will
go ahead and if so on what conditions; ss.38(2) states that these conditions
cannot be determined by reference to any profits, income or output of the
mine. When determining the amount of compensation that should be paid,
the arbitral body is bound by a similar compensible interest test (ss.23(4)
and s.240), meaning compensation that would be payable if the native title
holder instead held ordinary title (freehold estate in fee simple). The
payment of this money will be from the mining company to the body
corporate and will probably be paid prospectively and in lump sum, as is
made to ordinary land holders.
There has been much discussion on the nexus between royalty payments
and Aboriginal consent under the ALRA. Justice Woodward's report
recommended that minerals continue to be vested in the Crown but that in
the interest of Aboriginal self-determination access to Aboriginal land be
controlled by them (Woodward 1974: 104). This recommendation gave
rise to the quasi-property right system of the ALRA. Several sources
express concern over the indistinct nexus between the veto right and the
ownership of minerals (Altman 1985, 1993; 1C 1991; Tasman Institute
1993). The 1C went so far as to suggest that the nexus be made explicit,
that is, dejure rights to minerals be vested in Aborigines so their consent to
mine attracts the payment of royalties for minerals rather than for consent.
These sources all generally suggest that minerals should not be the
criterion upon which compensation for mining activity be based, if
compensating Aborigines for the damage mining does to their rights is in
fact the objective of the payments. The reason for this being that the
damage bears little, if any, relation to the value of the minerals extracted.
It would appear that when drafting the NTA the government took these
considerations into account. In the negotiation period the contract between
miners and Aborigines can refer to the value of the minerals present, a
quasi-royalty payment, but in the arbitration stage the arbitral body bases
the amount of compensation it awards upon the damage done to native title
rights by the mine. The value of the minerals extracted is explicitly
excluded from the arbitral body's determination thus removing the nexus
between the value of minerals and compensation. The removal of the nexus
between minerals and compensation gives rise to the new issue of the basis
for ascertaining the compensation determinations of the arbitral body.
The issue of compensation payment determination arises because the
strategic behaviour problem of asymmetric information will not be
overcome by the inclusion of arbitration in the NTA. There will still be
incentives for both miners and Aborigines to misrepresent the
benefit/detriment of allowing mining, given that the arbitral body does not
have access to each party's true valuation.
If any damage done to Aborigines' native title rights must be fully
compensated by the miner, then Aborigines have the potential to influence
the compensation payment they receive since the arbitrator may not be
aware of how Aborigines could alter their behaviour to minimise the
impact the mine. In this case Aborigines have no incentive to minimise the
effects of their behaviour on miners because they will receive more
compensation the greater their damage claim. If instead the compensation
paid to Aborigines is independent of whether they will decide to minimise
the effects of the mine then there is no incentive for Aborigines to take
fewer precautions in their actions. Cooler (1982), at a theoretical level,
recommends basing compensation payments on the lost rental value of the
land, because this is determined by the market and cannot be influenced by
either party's actions. Cooler claims that this will generate allocative
efficiency. Applying this kind of lost rental value analysis to the ALRA
and NTA is problematic given that native title is inalienable, although there
may be scope for internal alienation within a group of native title holders if
that right of transfer constitutes a native title right. Inalienability means
that there can be no market in Aboriginal land within which to establish
lost rental values. In other spheres of the law the courts award
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compensation for the infringement of rights that are not traded although
standard guidelines for compensation payments are often set. This option
could be exercised in the NTA's arbitration stage and may go some way
towards overcoming marginal rent seeking by miners or by Aborigines.
The cost of enforcing a contract
Under the ALKA
The cost of enforcing contracts under the ALKA has been high. The
Oenpelli road dispute (Carroll 1983: 345-46; Kesteven 1983) was an
example of the continual pressure to maintain property rights once
contracts have been signed. In this case there was disagreement between
the land council and the local Aborigines as to the distribution of both s.43
and ss.64(3) payments amongst those Aborigines living in the areas
affected by the mine. In particular there was one group of traditional
owners through whose land the road to the mine ran, but who were not
receiving a significant share of the agreement moneys distributed. The
ALRA was amended in 1980 following the dispute, so that miners would
be guaranteed access to a mine site for which an agreement on
compensation had been reached. The amendment to the ALRA protected
the property right acquired by the miner but in the process it diminished the
property right of the traditional owners of the area through which the road
had to run.
In 1980 ss.48D(3) was inserted into the ALRA, stating that inadequate
consultation under s.48 is an insufficient reason to invalidate a mining
agreement. This amendment also protects the property rights of mining
companies since mining agreements will be valid even if Aborigines
affected by a mine have not been fully informed of the mine's impact, or
have not been given the opportunity to voice their objection to it (Altman
1983: 109).
Another problem Aborigines have in enforcing their property right in the
post-agreement stage is that ss.64(3) grants are distributed by the land
councils, under ss.35(2), to those Aborigines living in areas affected by a
mine, including the traditional owners. The ALRA requires that ss.64(3)
payments are not just reserved for traditional owners (irrespective of place
of residence) but they should be shared with other Aborigines residing in
areas affected by mining (irrespective of their land ownership status)'
(Altman 1994: 6). There has been enormous discretion in these payments
which has meant that traditional owners cannot be guaranteed any of the
moneys paid into the ABTA, even though they had the right to exercise the
veto. Hence, unless one group of traditional owners occupies the whole of
an area affected by a proposed mine there has been little incentive to allow
mining to proceed.
Under the NTA
II
The two problems identified above have the potential to be overcome in
the NTA. The first, by having the land councils' monopoly on
representation during negotiations for exploration and mining agreements
removed, and the second, by having the payments made by miners to
native title holders payable only to them.
The Northern Territory Department of Mines and Energy recommended in
1984, as did the 1C in 1991, that the ALRA be amended to allow face-to-
face negotiations with traditional owners (Northern Territory Department
of Mines and Energy 1984; 1C 1991). This option has been incorporated to
some extent in the NTA. Under the NTA, native title holders may elect to
have their native title held in trust or may elect to continue to be the
common law native title holders.9 Irrespective of the trust decision, the
native title holders must also nominate a body corporate to represent their
native title rights, carry out functions in the NTA, and be the point of
contact for other interests in the land.I0
The advantage the NTA's body corporate system will have over the
ALRA's land council system will be that each body corporate can negotiate
directly with miners. There will therefore be a greater chance that
Aborigines' valuation of their land will be accurately reflected in the body
corporate's decision whether to negotiate a mining agreement. It could be
argued that having large Aboriginal peak organisations such as the land
councils represents an economy of scale. The Northern Territory
experience indicates, however, that some Aboriginal groups have been
dissatisfied with the quality of representation afforded by the land councils
and that a free rider problem may exist (1C 1991: 66). This would suggest
that the extra costs generated by having a large number of small groups
may be offset by the superior representation afforded by smaller bodies."
All moneys paid by miners under the NTA will go to the body corporate
for distribution among native title holders.12 This will mean that native title
holders will be able to enforce their native title rights in the post-agreement
phase as against other Aboriginal interests; Aborigines living in areas
affected by a mine's operation who cannot claim native title will not be
compensated.13
If an Aboriginal group is granted native title over an area of land upon
which other groups of Aborigines reside it is doubtful that compensation
moneys will accrue to non-native title holders if a mine opens. This
situation does not statutorily exist under the ALRA where moneys are
payable, under ss.35(2), to those Aborigines living in the area affected by a
mine, irrespective of their ownership status. From the perspective of the
native title holders the guarantee that mining moneys will accrue to them
alone will provide a clear incentive structure, but in the process these
provisions have the potential to impact negatively upon Aborigines who
are unable to claim native title. Under the ALRA the government was
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effectively addressing equity issues through the 'areas affected' provisions,
at the expense of efficiency.14 It has been argued that the government
should simply address Aboriginal welfare problems directly and it would
seem that the NTA reflects these criticisms.
A contract enforcement cost created by the NTA that does not exist in the
ALRA is that there is no sunset period within which native title parties
must come forward. (There was initially no sunset period in the ALRA; the
provision to lodge claims by 1997 was inserted into the ALRA by
amendment to s.50 in 1987.) This will potentially give rise to two costs.
First, a mining company could apply for an exploration licence unopposed
(ss.28(l)(a)) then apply for a mining lease at which time a native title party
may come forward claiming the right to go through the
negotiation/arbitration procedures with the mining company. There is also
the potential for a native title party to come forward after the mine has
commenced operation. To protect itself from such claims a mining
company can make a non-claimant application for determination of native
title (ss.61(l), s.67) at a cost of $300. If this application is unopposed then
the mining company is entitled to the protection of s.24 of the NTA,
meaning that if subsequently a native title party comes forward the
government, not the mining company, is liable for any compensation
payable for past acts, although the miner will be liable for compensation
for any future acts, subject to the exclusions of ss.26(3) and (4).
Secondly, a mining company could negotiate an agreement with a native
title claimant at the time of the grant of a mining lease but subsequently
find that a native title determination decides that the claimant is not in fact
the native title holder. A mining company can protect itself from this by
writing a clause into its contract with a native title claimant stating that the
contract is dependent upon the native title claimant being determined the
native title holder and that no money will be paid until a determination of
native title is made in that claimant's favour or, alternatively, that any
moneys paid be held in trust, under the provisions of s.52 of the NTA, until
native title is determined.
Another solution to this problem is demonstrated by the Mt Todd
experience. The mining company, Zapopan, required as part of its contract
with the Jawoyn people that they surrender any future native title claims
and halt repeat land claims under the ALRA, in exchange for the grant of
the freehold title (without veto power) to the Mt Todd area, portion 3469.
The Mabo judgement identified, and the NTA statutorily recognised (s.21),
that a group of Aboriginal people could voluntarily surrender their native
title to the Crown thereby extinguishing native title. As this surrender was
part of the Mt Todd agreement no Jawoyn can now claim native title to
portion 3469.
The potential for a breakaway Jawoyn group was obviously contemplated,
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however, since the Jawoyn Association agreed to indemnify Zapopan in
respect of any losses occasioned by any assertion of native title or repeat
land claims by their people. Undertakings were also given by the Jawoyn
Association not to take, support or promote any action by any Jawoyn that
might prevent or impede the issue or continuance of the mineral leases, or
which may jeopardise or threaten financial arrangements by the company
in relation to the Mt Todd project. The potential for a claim of native title
by a non-Jawoyn Aboriginal group at a subsequent time was also
addressed. The Northern Land Council (NLC) formally agreed that the
Jawoyn were the only Aboriginal group whom they would act for or
recognise for native title or land claims issues over portion 3469 in the
future. Given that the Mt Todd area has been subject to an earlier,
exhaustive land rights claim and no group other than the Jawoyn was
found, there is little probability that such a scenario will arise (Stapp 1994:
14-6).
Moral hazard problems in a liability rule environment
Aborigines and miners are essentially bilateral monopolists; Aborigines
have a monopoly in the supply of land on any given plot of Aboriginal land
and miners effectively monopolise, through the exclusive exploration
licence system, the demand for that land. The presence of a bilateral
monopoly will only preclude a bargain being reached if the parties
concerned are not subject to competitive takeover bids. If the parties are
subject to takeover then other firms will see the opportunity for the gain of
surplus through coming to an agreement and will institute a takeover of the
parties concerned. This pressure does not exist in lands rights because
Aboriginal groups are not subject to takeover; if one group of Aborigines
will not come to an agreement with miners for the development of a mine,
another Aboriginal group cannot buy the land and come to an agreement
with the miners, because Aboriginal interests in land are inalienable. When
bilateral monopolies exist a strategic situation can develop and there can be
incentives for parties to conceal true intentions. In cases such as these,
private bargaining may not achieve efficiency unless there is an
institutional mechanism, such as compulsory arbitration, to dictate the
terms of the contract (Cooler and Marks 1982).
The Coase theorem suggests that a competitive market with no transactions
costs will achieve efficiency and Cooler and Marks show that in non-
competitive markets, such as bilateral monopolies, there is the potential for
an arbitration system to remove the inefficiency resulting in cases where
bargaining over the property right breaks down. The obstacle to
cooperation in these cases is not necessarily costs but the strategic nature
of the situation. Firms remain unsure as to how other firms will react, not
because it is too costly to tell one another but because the strategic nature
of the situation can make it worthwhile to conceal true valuations.
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The phrase coined by Mnookin (1979), 'Pre-trial bargaining is a game
played in the shadow of the law', embodies the framework of the NTA.
There is a possibility of settling out of court through bargaining, but if
bargaining breaks down, arbitration occurs and a binding resolution is
reached. This is in contrast to the ALRA where bargaining can continue
indefinitely at the discretion of the Minister for Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Affairs, under ss.42(13)(c).
Cooler and Marks (1982) have developed a model that helps to
demonstrate the impact eight observable factors will have on whether a
negotiated settlement will occur or whether arbitration will have to be
resorted to. From the results of their model it is possible to make some
policy recommendations, based on the assumption that it is preferable to
have private regulation (a negotiated settlement) than imposed regulation
(arbitration).
Table 1. Impact of parameter changes on probability of negotiated
settlement.
Probability of
Result Parameter Change negotiated settlement
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Increased urgency of resolution
Improved value of the arbitrated outcome
for either Aborigines or mining companies
Increase in the transaction costs in the
negotiation period
Increase in the transaction costs of the
arbitration period
Increase in earnings per period contingent
upon no resolution of dispute
Increase in spitefulness towards opponent
Less risk aversion
Increase in familiarity of opponent (less
uncertainty)
Increases
Decreases
Increases
Increases
Decreases
Decreases
Decreases
Increases
Source: Based on Cooler and Marks (1982).
According to result 1, a higher discount rate makes a miner more eager to
settle rather than postpone resolution of the dispute until arbitration. A
small mining company is likely to have a high discount rate because its
investment in any particular mining licence/lease application represents a
larger proportion of its investment potential, and for this reason it is unable
to have very many applications for licences/leases in at any one time. It is
therefore imperative to a small mining company that it negotiate a deal
swiftly so that its investment in any one project can quickly come to
fruition. Under the ALRA, only minor mining companies, including
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subsidiaries of the major mining companies, had until 1993 succeeded in
completing exploration agreements on Aboriginal land in the Northern
Territory (Tasman Institute 1993:12). This trend could well continue under
the NTA.
Contrast, for example, the Mt Todd and the McArthur River agreements
both of which were negotiated in the shadow of the NTA's development.
The Mt Todd agreement is more favourable to Aboriginal interests, took
less time to negotiate and has Zapopan NL (a small mining company), the
Northern Territory Government and the Jawoyn Association as signatories.
The McArthur River agreement is funded almost exclusively by the
Commonwealth, was negotiated over a prolonged period and has only the
Commonwealth, the NLC and the Gurdanji-Bingbinga Corporation as
signatories; the mining company Mt Isa Mines, a large mining company
and the Northern Territory government are not signatories to the
agreement. The reluctance of the larger mining companies is indicted by
the director of the Kimberley Land Council, Peter YUwho suggests that
some companies ... have acted in concert with the State [WA] government and the
Chamber of Mines and Energy to thwart agreements between small, subsidiary
mining companies and Aborigines. He names Stockdale Prospecting [a small
mining company] as one company 'that may have got the wrong end of the stick
where there might have been some joint venture arrangement where they may
have wanted to be more progressive and their partner has been reluctant. That is
not unusual in joint venture arrangements (M. Davis, 'Miners, Aborigines get
down to business', Business Review Weekly, 26 September 1994: 28).
According to result 2, if the arbitral body makes the value of arbitration
attractive to either Aborigines or miners then this will decrease the
probability that a negotiated outcome will be reached. For example, if the
arbitral body generally awards miserly compensation to Aborigines for the
impairment of their native title then arbitration will become a less risky
option for the mining company and there is greater probability that miners
will hold out for an arbitrated outcome. For this reason the membership of
the arbitral body is of great significance since its decisions will, to some
extent, determine the success and workability of the NTA. There is also the
need for the arbitral body to be relatively consistent so that there is no
constant imperative for either Aborigines or miners to seek arbitration in
the expectation of a non-precedent bound decision. Uncertainty about the
arbitrated outcome will generally also increase transactions costs. If there
is no objective source of information about the actual probabilities of
different outcomes occurring, the parties may expend considerable
resources attempting to convince the other party that it has overestimated
its prospects for success at the arbitration stage. There is also the potential
for both mining companies and Aborigines to be repeat players. In this case
the value of arbitration in terms of favourable precedent setting becomes
greater without this affecting the other player's expected value of an
arbitrated outcome. This will result in a negotiated settlement becoming
less likely.
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Result 3 concerns the cost of negotiating an agreement (for example legal
costs, parties' time and the cost of communication). If one round of
negotiating becomes more costly, then the parties will want to settle more
quickly to avoid the cost of protracted bargaining. There is also the
possibility that one party to the negotiations can affect the magnitude of the
transactions costs that must be borne by the other party. Under the NTA,
Aborigines can file native title claims on a prima facie basis.
Justice French [has] ruled that those claiming native title do not have to initially
present a prima facie case in support of their claim. The implication of this
ruling is that Aboriginal communities need not initially have to invest in heavy
legal resources to prepare a detailed case for native title claims (L. Tingle, 'Law
of the Land1, The Australian, 28 September 1994: 51).
This ruling seems 'fair' given that non-claimants only have to pay $300 to
submit an application for a determination. This ruling may impose costs on
the mining industry if Aborigines, in response to notification of a proposed
future act, file vexatious native title claims that do not have to be
stringently investigated before being registered. Aborigines can also
impose costs by applying for the negotiation phase to be extended,
although the risk associated with pursuing such an action is that the NTA
will be amended to eliminate the negotiation phase (Altman 1993). The
potential for these actions will make miners more likely to settle earlier
within the negotiation phase to avoid the costs of protracted bargaining.
Result 3 may not strictly hold under the NTA. First, because there is no
adequacy of negotiation clause within the NTA. Therefore if negotiation
costs increase, miners or Aborigines can opt out of the negotiation process
and wait for arbitration, if waiting for arbitration costs less than
negotiation. (Cooter and Marks specifically preclude this in their model.)
Secondly, Cooter and Marks' model assumes the relationship between the
litigants to be pre-existing (as in a divorce). If however, the transaction can
be voluntarily entered into, then additional negotiation costs may result in
decreased probability of settlement. That is, miners may simply choose not
to enter into a relationship with Aborigines.
The policy implications of this analysis are that everything possible should
be done to minimise transactions costs for all parties in the negotiation
phase. S.82 and s.109 of the NTA charge the National Native Title
Tribunal (NNTT) and the Federal Court with the task of providing a
determination mechanism that is fair, just, economical, informal, and
prompt. These words should not be interpreted lightly. The NNTT has the
somewhat opposed tasks of not wanting to discourage or intimidate
Aboriginal native title claimants from applying for a determination while at
the same time satisfying the concerns of the industries with whom it must
negotiate in the future. Justice French has said that despite the connotations
of the word 'tribunal' as a court of law, 'it might more accurately and
appropriately have been called the National Native Title Dispute
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Resolution Service' (L. Tingle, 'Law of the Land', The Australian, 28
September 1994:51).
Result 4 suggests that as the cost of arbitration increases, the wish to avoid
arbitration and settle in the negotiation phase increases. For this reason the
non-availability of royalty-type payments in the arbitration stage appears to
be good policy because it significantly increases the cost to Aborigines of
not coming to a negotiated agreement, therefore increasing the likelihood
of them coming to a negotiated agreement. As arbitration costs increase
miners, because they directly bear such costs, are also more likely to wish
to settle in the negotiation phase.
Result 5 suggests that if Aborigines do not want mining on their land then
it could potentially be advantageous for them not to come to a negotiated
agreement before the arbitration phase since they will continue to enjoy
occupation of the disputed land until the decision of the arbitrator is made,
irrespective of whether the decision is in their favour or not. This may
decrease the probability of reaching a negotiated settlement.
Result 6 indicates that spite will make a party willing to destroy some of
the surplus of doing a deal in order to reduce the payoff for the other
player, even if so doing reduces its own payoff. Increased spite increases a
party's willingness to proceed to arbitration to attempt to destroy the
surplus.
Result 7 indicates that risk averse players are less inclined to gamble in an
attempt to get a larger share of the stakes. Mining companies that are large
have their company risk spread over a large number of projects, both in
Australia and offshore. This will tend to mean that in any one project they
are less likely to be risk averse compared with smaller mining companies,
because that project's risk is to some extent diversified. Larger companies
are as a result more likely to gamble and demand a higher share of the
stakes in the negotiation period and take the risk of this resulting in
arbitration. For larger companies therefore there is a decreased probability
of settlement in the negotiation phase. Smaller companies on the other
hand, already have a large amount of risk in their operations, and are
unable to spread greater project risk over other successful projects. For this
reason they will tend to more risk averse in the negotiation period and this
will increase the probability of settlement.
Result 8 suggests that increased familiarity of opponents will increase the
probability of a negotiated settlement. This is because as each player
receives more information about the other they both become more familiar
with their opponent's likely strategy, meaning there is less likelihood of
miscalculation in the negotiation period which results in arbitration
occurring. Therefore if both parties to the negotiations are repeat players it
is more likely that a negotiated settlement will occur.
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Summary and Conclusion
The potential for inefficiencies in the ALRA and the NTA has been
discussed at some length above. A summary of the arguments given are
contained in the synoptic table below.
Table 2. Potential inefficiencies in the ALRA and the NTA.
Reason for
potential
inefficiency
Aboriginal Land Rights
Act (Northern Territory)
1976 Native Title Act 1993
NTA provisions
to increase or
decrease
efficiency
compared to the
ALRA
(1) Transaction
costs
(a) The cost of
searching for
parties with
whom to
negotiate
Traditional owners must
be represented by the land
council for the claims
process.
Native title claimants can be
represented by any
representative body they
choose.
Increase.
Land councils funded
from mining royalties.
Representative bodies can
be funded from consolidated
Increase.
revenue.
Creation of register of
traditional owners is
discretionary.
Creation of a public register
of body corporates is
mandatory.
Increase.
Responsibility of the land
council to notify
traditional owners of a
mining lease application.
Responsibility of native title
parties to register a claim at
the time a mine is proposed,
or of the Registrar to notify
registered native title
claimants and holders.
Increase.
(b) The cost of
negotiations
Conjunctive agreements. Disjunctive agreements
subject to the exclusion and
expedited procedures.
Unsure, but
probably
increase if the
expedited and
exclusion
provisions are
utilised.
Recourse to arbitration not
automatic.
Mandatory binding
arbitration if negotiations
fail.
Increase.
Minimum of 30 per cent
of ABTA income goes to
traditional owners; they
can also receive s.64(4)
payments and additional
negotiated royalties. All
payments are made via the
land councils.
All of the negotiated or
arbitrated payments go to
the native title holders via
the body corporate. This will
make incentive structures
clear.
Increase.
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Table 2. cont'd.
Reason for
potential
inefficiency
(c) The cost of
enforcing
contracts
(2) Bilateral
monopoly
Aboriginal Land Rights
Act (Northern Territory)
1976
There are time limits on
negotiations for
exploration licenses but
these are not binding in
practise. There are no time
limits within which
mining license
negotiations should occur.
Land councils negotiate
with miners and decide
whether to allow mining.
Inadequate consultation
with traditional owners is
insufficient to invalidatea
mining agreement.
Distribution of areas
affected moneys
determined by the land
councils; moneys are paid
to Aborigines living in
areas affected by mining
and traditional owners.
Sunset period within
which traditional owners
must come forward.
Arbitration only occurs if
both parties agree to it,
therefore, there is no
discipline of moral hazard
problems.
Native Title Act 1993
Parties can only negotiate
for four months for an
exploration license and six
months for a mining license.
Arbitration must attempt to
be completed within the
same time frames.
A body corporate,
representative of the native
title holders, negotiates
directly with miners and
makes the decision whether
to allow mining.
All compensation moneys
go to the native title holders
via their body corporate.
No sunset period. This is
mitigated by: ability of
mining companies to make
non-claimant applications
for native title; trust
provisions for the payments
to claimants; and potential
for the surrender of native
title rights.
Automatic recourse to
arbitration, forcing parties to
self regulate. Potential
increase in efficiency if the
arbitrator can reflect the
valuations of both parties.
NTA provisions
to increase or
decrease
efficiency
compared to the
ALRA
Increase, if the
NTA's time
limits are
strictly adhered
to.
Increase/decreae
depending on
economy of
scale issue.
Probably
decrease.
Potential to
increase but in
some cases may
decrease.
The above analysis suggests that the Commonwealth Government took into
account some of the criticisms levelled at the ALRA by economic
commentators when drafting the NTA.
The NTA includes provisions that make the identification of native title
parties significantly more simple than under the ALRA, including a
mandatory native title register, of a different nature from that included in
the ALRA; funding Aboriginal representative bodies from consolidated
revenue; and making it the responsibility of Aborigines to make their claim
of native title known if a mining licence is proposed.
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The NTA also includes provisions to make negotiations between miners
and Aborigines less costly than under the ALKA. These include the option
for disjunctive mining contracts; time limits within which negotiations
must occur; the rapid and mandatory recourse to arbitration if negotiations
are unsuccessful; the potential for the use of expedited provisions for
exploration activity; clear incentives for Aborigines and miners to resolve
competing land use issues; and a better defined nexus between mining
activity and moneys paid to Aboriginal land owners/native title holders.
The ability of both Aborigines and miners to enforce their contractual
rights in the post-agreement phase is stronger under the NTA than the
ALKA; this is because the monopoly of the land councils has been
removed and because compensation payments are payable directly to body
corporates. The NTA, however, creates no sunset period within which
native title claimants must come forward. This may create costs for those
wishing to mine although the government has included provisions for non-
claimant applications which should go some way towards mitigating this
problem.
Commentators have noted (1C 1991; Kenyon 1993) that if Aborigines
value the land associated with a proposed exploration/mining licence more
than miners value it, then the land should remain in Aboriginal hands.
Notwithstanding this, if transactions costs are prohibitive then it can
become impossible to determine either miners' or Aborigines' valuation of
the land because transactions costs erode the value to both parties of
negotiating an agreement. For this reason the lower the transactions costs,
the better parties are able to decide upon a level of mining (level of
Aboriginal specific investment) that reflects their valuation of the land.
This analysis would suggest that the NTA will generate greater efficiency
than the ALRA.
It may well be, however, that transactions costs will still be high under the
NTA; too high for many mining agreements, based upon the exchange of a
property right, to be negotiated. For this reason the introduction of a
liability rule under the NTA, through the establishment of the arbitral body,
has the potential to generate relative efficiency in this situation because it
removes the transaction from the market and places it before an arbitrator
who can exogenously determine whether mining should occur and if so
under what terms. It must be recognised, however, that an arbitral system
has the potential to generate inefficient outcomes if the arbitrator cannot
correctly determine the value of the resource to the parties.
If it is not transactions costs that are precluding mining agreements under
the ALRA but a strategic problem due to bilateral monopolies, then the
reduction of transactions costs, even to a zero level, will not necessarily
generate efficiency. The presence of an arbitral body is needed in such
circumstances to determine whether mining should occur and if so on what
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terms. If this moral hazard model accurately reflects the land rights
situation then greater efficiency can be achieved under the NTA than under
the ALRA.
Irrespective of whether the allocation problems in the ALRA stern from
transactions costs or moral hazard issues the NTA represents a potential
means to overcome those problems.
Notes
1. For a discussion of the economic conceptualisation of property rights and its
application to the land rights issue, see McEwin (1993).
2. For an examination of the costs and benefits associated with creating a register
under the ALRA see Smith (1984).
3. Dodson 1994 discusses the potential role of representative bodies under the NTA.
4. Northern Territory of Australia v Robert Tickner, Minister for Aboriginal Affairs,
Northern Land Council, Nuralindji Aboriginal Corporation, and Stockdale
Prospecting Ltd, unreported decision of the Supreme Court of the Northern
Territory, 11 March 1992.
5. Minerals Royalties Act 1982 (NT) and Petroleum Processing and Mining Act
1978 (NT) respectively. Uranium royalties, however, are Commonwealth
royalties paid to the Department of Primary Industry and Energy. From the 5.5
per cent ad valorem collected according to the Ranger agreement 4.25 per cent
goes to the ABTA and 1.25 per cent goes to the NT government.
6. See Altman (1983) for a full discussion of the financial arrangements of the
ALRA.
7. It would seem that mining industry criticisms of the ALRA have influenced the
adoption of an arbitrated process in the NTA. A report by the Northern Territory
Department of Mines and Energy suggested reforms to the ALRA based upon a
survey of the 33 companies it had granted leave to negotiate with the land
councils for exploration licences. On the basis of this survey the Department
recommended that the ALRA should be amended to allow for the automatic
appointment of an arbitrator should negotiations prove unsuccessful after a period
of one year from the start of negotiations (Northern Territory Department of
Mines and Energy 1984). The requisite period in the NTA is set at only four
months for exploration and six months for mining.
8. See Sullivan (1994) for a discussion of the potential problems associated with
ss.26(3) and (4) exclusions.
9. For a full discussion of the benefits and risks of trustees versus agents see Tanna
1994. See Stead (1994) for a discussion of the ALRA experience of vesting title
in Land Trusts.
10. For elaboration of the Part 2 Division 6 procedures see Fingleton (1994).
11. The benefits of having land councils as umbrella organisations are discussed by
Vachon and Toyne (1983: 323-4) and the hazards by von Sturmer (1982: 100-
102) and 1C (1991).
12. This is consistent with Justice Woodward's recommendation that individuals
should not receive 'compensation' moneys (Woodward 1973: 131).
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13. See Mclntyre (1994) for a discussion of the issues confronting Aborigines living
in areas that are the subject of native title claims but who are not part of the
claiming group. Also see Merlan (1994) who describes the differences between
the ALRA's provisions and the NTA's provisions in this area and who notes the
distinction between 'entitlement' and 'need'.
14. Berndt (1982: 10) argues that the ALRA's areas affected provisions are in fact too
narrow. He notes that while the ALRA stipulates that royalties be paid to
territorial units, including those Aborigines with a traditional spiritual affiliation,
the ALRA does not recognise the economic ownership of those persons who
would traditionally share in the land.
15. The potential for revocations and revisions is discussed by Forbes (1994: 13).
Glossary
Allocative efficiency: There is a gain in allocative efficiency whenever resources shift
to a more highly valued use. Allocative efficiency in this context means that land after
trade/arbitration is in the hands of the party that values it the most (see Posner 1986). A
socially optimal level of mining is a level that fully reflects both the private and social
benefits and costs of allowing mining on Aboriginal land, on a dollar-is-a-dollar
welfare basis.
Bilateral monopolies: Bilateral monopolies exist in an environment where one party has
a monopoly in supply the other party has a monopoly in demand.
Discount rate: A firm's discount rate depends on its time preference; a firm with a high
discount rate is one for whom delay is particularly costly.
Economy of scale: If it is efficient to have a large rather than small organisation then
there is an economy of scale. Economies of scale arise in operations because fixed costs
need to be incurred only once and can be shared by the operation as a whole.
Free rider problem: Free rider problems arise when costs cannot be directly attributed to
those on whose behalf they are incurred. Free rider problems are prevalent in the
provision of public goods such as the services of land councils.
Liability rule: A liability rule creates a right to claim damages for certain injuries to a
resource. Liability rules allow a person to use a resource if they are prepared to pay for
the damage their use inflicts.
Moral hazard: Whenever the expected returns that one party will receive from another
depends in part on the recipients own actions there is the potential for moral hazard.
Moral hazard arises out of an information asymmetry between the parties to a
transaction. Because neither Aborigines nor miners can know the value of land to the
other there arises incentives to conceal true valuations in order to extract some
concession from the other party.
Property right: A property right is an exclusive right to the use, control and enjoyment
of some resource. It confers the right to exclude others from the use of the resource
unless they have the consent of the owner of the right.
Strict liability: If a rule of strict liability is adopted then any damage done to
Aborigines' native title rights must be fully compensated by the miner, irrespective of
whether Aborigines had the potential to mitigate that damage.
Transactions costs: Transactions costs can be defined as 'the costs of establishing and
maintaining property rights' (Allen 1991).
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